

CENTER ROUTING SLIP

Approved For Release 2004/02/11 : CIA-RDP78B05703A000200040006-4

Deputy Chief, Support Staff

9 July 70

TO	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS
DIRECTOR	4	7/15	We are asking the Log & Security Branches + TSPG to answer such questions as how many pieces of equipment are involved, replacement costs, in-house capability to modify, feasibility of frequent, unannounced Sec. inspections of USGS, emission logs beyond perimeter fence, etc. We keep you posted.
DEP/DIRECTOR	3	7-14	
EXEC/DIRECTOR	2	7/14	
SPECIAL ASST	1	7/14	
ASST TO DIR		7/11	
ASST TO DEP/DIR			
CH/PPBS			
DEP CH/PPBS			
EO/PPBS			
CH/IEG			
DEP CH/IEG			
EO/IEG			
CH/PSG			
DEP CH/PSG			
EO/PSG			
CH/TSSG			
DEP CH/TSSG			
EO/TSSG			
CH/SSD/TSSG			
PERSONNEL			
LOGISTICS			
TRAINING			
RECORDS MGT			
SECURITY			
FINANCE			
DIR/IAS/DDI			
CH/DIAXX-4			
CH/DIAAP-9			

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Declass Review by NIMA/DOD

SECRET

29 JUN 1970

CS-M-70-389

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Support Division, NPIC

ATTENTION [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : TEMPEST Tests, [REDACTED]

1. In the period between 11 February and 16 May 1969, the National Security Agency performed on-site TEMPEST tests of certain equipments located in [REDACTED]. The purpose of the tests was to determine if compromising emanations could be detected either through space or on telephone and electric lines at locations not occupied or controlled by the Agency. The final report on these tests was received on 19 May 1970, and evaluation has been completed; discussions concerning the evaluation were held with NPIC representatives Messrs. [REDACTED] on 10 June 1970. The remainder of this memorandum is a summary of those discussions.

2. Based on the tests, we are of the opinion that wall, ceiling and floor attenuation is insufficient to eliminate vulnerability resulting from Fastrand, key punch, KSR, Flexowriter, and Justowriter electromagnetic radiation. Thus, portions of [REDACTED] accessible from [REDACTED] the U.S.G.S. offices, the roof of [REDACTED] and the other areas within the fence are locations where an unauthorized receiver may intercept compromising emanations. To minimize the threat of vulnerability, we recommend: (a) frequent, unannounced security inspections of the U.S.G.S. area and [REDACTED]; (b) tighter control of personnel access within the fenced area; (c) RED/BLACK wiring separation for all equipments; (d) replacement of the Flexowriters, Justowriter, and KSR's with Teletype Corporation TEMPEST modified Model 37 equipment as soon as practical; and (e) positioning the 0755 line printers at the median point between Room 2N437 and the wall adjacent to [REDACTED] with the rear of the printers facing Room 2S451.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SUBJECT: TEMPEST Tests, [REDACTED]

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3. If further information is desired, members of my Staff are available to discuss the subject at length. Point of contact for this matter is [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
Chief, Communications Security Staff, OC